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RIGHT TO STRIKE AND COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION: PANACEA OR PLACEBO?
JOHN T. COUGHLIN* and DENNIS W. RADER**
I. SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
The increasing frequency and severity of work stoppages in
municipal employment in Wisconsin has resulted in a need to re-
examine and analyze Wisconsin's established municipal labor law
legislation, policies and procedures.Wisconsin has long had a labor
law covering municipal employees. In 1959, Wisconsin became the
first state to enact basic legislation covering municipal employees.
In 1961, Wisconsin again was the first state to enact mediation and
fact-finding procedures for resolving municipal disputes. In 1971,
Wisconsin passed legislation that provided for compulsory interest
arbitration for law enforcement and firefighting personnel.
Despite the fact that Wisconsin has been in the vanguard of
those states enacting municipal labor relations legislation, illegal
municipal employee strikes during the 1970's have been increasing
at an alarming rate. Consequently, the demand for additional mu-
nicipal impasse resolution legislation has been increasing in both
volume and intensity. Assuming arguendo that there is a causal
relationship between the increase in municipal strikes and deficien-
cies within Wisconsin's current Municipal Employment Relations
Act, the ultimate question then becomes "What type of legislative
enactment would lessen the number and severity of municipal em-
ployees strikes?"
* B.A. 1962, Marquette University; M.S. (management) 1964, University of Illinois;
J.D. 1968, Marquette University Law School; member in the law firm of Mulcahy &
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Relations Commission.
** B.A. 1963, Holy Cross College, La Crosse, Wisconsin; M.S. (industrial relations)
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Before attempting to answer this question, let us first examine
Wisconsin's Municipal Employment Relations Act, with special
attention being given to the impasse resolution machinery provided
therein. Then, for comparative purposes, we will examine impasse
resolution legislation in states other than Wisconsin.
II. WISCONSIN'S MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT
A. Background Information
As noted, in 1959 the Wisconsin legislature passed the first
municipal labor relations law in the United States. Under that law
municipal employees were granted the right of self-organization,
to affiliate with labor organizations of their own choosing and the
right to be represented by labor organizations of their own choice
in conferences and negotiations with their municipal employers on
questions of wages, hours and conditions of employment. These
provisions outlining employees' rights to organize and negotiate
with municipal employers were enacted in the hope of diminishing
the threat of municipal employee strikes over recognition issues.
Impasse procedures for municipal sector collective bargaining
disputes were not established under the 1959 legislation. Under
Wisconsin law at that time the Industrial Commission had the
jurisdiction to appoint mediators or fact finders to intervene and
facilitate settlement in such disputes.2 However, under a statutory
provision allowing for exchange of services between state agencies,
mediation and fact-finding requests were referred to the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board (WERB), the state agency adminis-
tering the private sector Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.3
In 1961 the Wisconsin legislature responded to the growing
demand for more workable municipal sector dispute settlement
machinery by establishing mediation and fact-finding procedures
and empowering the WERB to administer the new legislation.'
1. Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 509, § 1, creating Wis. STAT. § 111.70.
2. WIs. STAT. § 101.10(8) (1959).
It shall be the duty of the Industrial Commission, and it shall have the power,
jurisdiction and authority . . . to do all in its power to promote voluntary arbitra-
tion, mediation and conciliation of disputes between employers and employes, and
to avoid the necessity of resorting to lock-outs, boycotts, blacklists, discriminations,
and legal proceedings in matters of employment.
3. Wis. STAT. § 20.904 (1959). "State boards and commissions shall cooperate in the
performance and execution of state work and shall interchange such data, reports, and other
information, and by proper arrangements between the offices, commissions and boards shall
interchange such services of the employer."
4. Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 633, § I, amending Wis. STAT. § 111.70.
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Legislative measures to shift jurisdiction over such disputes from
the Industrial Commission to the WERB had been suggested in an
Attorney General's ruling on mediation procedures in 1960.5
In 1971, after several years of threats of strikes in police and
firefighter collective bargaining disputes, a special statute provid-
ing for compulsory final and binding interest arbitration for law
enforcement personnel and firefighters was enacted. 7
B. Impasse Resolution Procedures Contained Within the
Municipal Employment Relations Act
The Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA) contains
the following impasse resolution procedures:
1. Mediation
Mediation has been defined as "the intercession of an impartial
third person in a dispute for the purpose of assisting the parties to
resolve their differences voluntarily."8
Mediation of municipal disputes is provided for under section
S111.70(4)(c) I of MERA. Although the aforesaid statute provides
for mediation by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion (WERC), it is the policy of the Commission to encourage the
parties to a labor dispute to settle their differences themselves
through a continuation of the collective bargaining process. How-
ever, if the parties cannot reach agreement after reasonable efforts,
the Commission will appoint one of their staff to mediate the
dispute. It should be noted that the function of the mediator is to
encourage voluntary settlement; the mediator does not have the
power to compel the parties to agree.
The 1961 legislation which created the mediation function pro-
vided that mediation could be initiated only upon request of both
parties to the dispute. In 1971 this provision was amended whereby
mediation could be initiated upon request of one or both of the
parties or upon initiation of the Commission. It should be noted
that although the 1971 enactment does allow either one party of
5. 49 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 144 (1960).
6. Interest arbitration refers to arbitration of new contract terms (employee-employer
"interests") and arises when there is an impasse in the collective bargaining process. Interest
arbitration should be distinguished from grievance arbitration, which is usually the final step
in a grievance procedure in which the arbitrator makes a definite decision on an issue in
dispute arising under the terms of an existing labor contract.
7. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 247, creating Wis. STAT. § 111.77.
8. R. MOBERLY and C. MULCAHY, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR RELATIONS 28 (1974)
quoting from MAGGIOLO, TEHCNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABOR DISPUTES 10 (1971).
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the commission to initiate mediation, this does not normally occur
because mediation is by its nature a voluntary, consensual process.
Forced mediation without the approval of one of the parties of the
dispute is in all but the most extreme cases ineffective at its very
inception.
2. Fact-Finding
Wisconsin's fact-finding procedures are found in section
111.70(4)(c)3 of MERA. Section 111.70(4)(c)3 of MERA provides
that either party or the parties may petition the Commission to
initiate fact-finding. However, the Commission will insist prior to
initiating fact-finding that the parties have been negotiating for a
reasonable period of time, that all settlement procedures (if any)
established by the parties be exhausted and that the parties are at
deadlock with respect to any dispute between them arising out of
the collective bargaining process. The Commission determines
whether a deadlock, in fact, exists.
Section 111.70(4)(c)3a provides that when the Commission
decides "that fact-finding should be initiated, it shall appoint a
qualified, disinterested person or 3-member panel, when jointly
requested by the parties, to function as a fact finder." Section
111 .70(4)(c)3b provides that the fact finder hold a hearing concern-
ing the matters in dispute. The aforesaid section specifically states
that, "Upon completion of the hearing, the fact finder shall make
written findings of fact and recommendations for solution of the
dispute and shall cause the same to be served on the parties and
the commission." Under this statute, fact-finding is available to all
municipal employees except for law enforcement personnel and
firefighters, who have access to final and binding interest arbitra-
tion.' Finally, it should be carefully noted that the statute does not
make the recommendations of the fact finder binding on either of
the parties to the dispute. The recommendations of the fact finder
are advisory only and only become binding if the parties would
voluntarily so agree.
3. Final and Binding Compulsory Interest Arbitration of Dis-
putes Involving Law Enforcement Personnel and Firefighters
Section 111.77 of the Wisconsin Statutes was enacted in 1971
and amended in 1973. The statute currently provides for final and
9. Milwaukee firemen are an exception to this rule because they do not have access to
final and binding interest arbitration but would have the ability to petition for fact-finding.
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binding compulsory interest arbitration of collective bargaining
disputes involving all law enforcement personnel and firefighters in
counties and municipalities other than Milwaukee with a popula-
tion of 2,500 or more. The Milwaukee police are subject to compu-
sory final and binding interest arbitration under a specific section
of 111.70, Wisconsin Statutes. 10 However, Milwaukee firefighters
do not have access to compulsory final and binding interst arbitra-
tion under either 111.70 or 111.77 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
Section 111.77 of the Wisconsin Statutes requires at section
(1)(a) that the party desiring to modify or terminate a contract
must "serve written notice upon the other party to the contract of
the proposed termination or modification 180 days prior to the
expiration date thereof, or if the contract contains no expiration
date, 60 days prior to the time it proposed to make such termina-
tion or modification. . . ." The party desiring to modify or termi-
nate the contract must notify the Commission of the existence of
a dispute within 90 days after the notice provided for in section
(1)(a) quoted above.
Section 111.77 of the Wisconsin Statutes further provides that
the current contract existing between the parties continue in full
force and effect without the union resorting to strike or the munici-
pal employer to lockout for a period of 60 days after notice is given
to the Commission of the existence of a dispute or until the expira-
tion date of the contract, whichever occurs later. In addition, the
parties must participate in mediation sessions if requested to do so
by the Commission and they must exhaust any type of impasse
resolution agreed to by the parties, including binding arbitration.
Either party may petition the Commission to initiate compul-
sory final and binding interest arbitration of the dispute. The Com-
mission is required to investigate and to determine if an impasse
has been reached and may conduct further mediation during such
investigation. If the Commission determines that an impasse has
been reached, it shall issue an order for arbitration. The Commis-
sion then submits a panel of five arbitrators and after the parties
alternately strike four of the five, the remaining person is ap-
pointed by the Commission as the arbitrator. The arbitrator's ex-
penses are shared equally between the parties.
Section 111.77(4) sets forth two forms of arbitration involving
wages, hours and conditions of employment: Form 1 allows the
arbitrator to determine all issues in dispute; under form 2, both
10. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)jm).
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parties shall submit their final offer in effect at the time the arbitra-
tion petition was filed and the arbitrator then selects one of the two
final offers as the final award. Form 2 is utilized unless the parties
agree to use form 1.
The arbitrator is provided with specific criteria to guide him in
his decision. For example, he must give weight to the public inter-
est by examining the financial ability of the unit of government to
meet the costs involved and the lawful authority of the employer.
These and other factors must be balanced with the employees'
interest by consulting the cost of living index and evaluating the
wages, hours and conditions of employment with those employees
performing similar services in comparable communities. The arbi-
trator's decision is final and binding.
III. EXPERIENCE OF STATES OTHER THAN WISCONSIN WITH
MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS LEGISLATION
Now that we have briefly discussed the parameters of Wiscon-
sin's municipal labor law, let us examine the labor law legislation
found in other states, with particular emphasis being given to im-
passe resolution procedures found within that legislation.
A. States Granting Bargaining and Organization Rights
Thirty-seven states have granted municipal employees some
form of bargaining and organization rights. Twenty-seven of those
states have additional provisions establishing procedures for the
resolution of bargaining impasses through mediation or fact-
finding;" legislation in the other ten states is restricted to coverage
of union recognition and bargaining rights." Several states have
declared that their laws allowing municipal employee organization
and bargaining rights were enacted with the express purpose of
alleviating public sector labor conflict."
Under state legislation providing for union recognition proce-
II. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT, 51:501 RF-63. (hereinafter GERR).
12. Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missiouri, Utah,
Virginia. GERR 51:501 RF-63.
13. Hawaii, Indiana, Minnesota. These states have incorporated language on the pur-
poses of such legislation from a model state public employee relations bill drafted by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1970. GERR 51:211 RF-74.
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dures, municipal employers can voluntarily recognize their em-
ployees' bargaining representative or agree to an election con-
ducted by a neutral third party pursuant to local or state guide-
lines.
A wide variety of "negotiation models" for the municipal sec-
tor have developed. In Kentucky, municipal employees have the
right to present proposals on wages, hours and conditions of em-
ployment. 4 Under Kansas and California law, 5 municipal employ-
ees have the obligation to "meet and confer," to provide an oppor-
tunity for the employee organization representatives to set forth
their requests and positions on various items. Presently, most
states have enacted legislation which authorizes and requires public
employers to enter into negotiations with employee groups.
B. States Providing Mediation Services
Mediation procedures vary from state to state. Legislation
which provides for mediation only when requested by both parties
to the dispute reflects the conviction that mediation is a totally
voluntary process and can work only between two parties mutually
agreeing to a third party's intervention." Legislation which allows
either party to the dispute or the state agency to request mediation
represents a judgment that there may be some value in the utiliza-
tion of a third party neutral despite the disinclination of one of the
parties to initially agree to mediation. 7
Most of the states with comprehensive public employee rela-
tions legislation have a state agency with a full staff of mediators
which provides service to the parties without cost. Several states
manifest a certain reluctance to encourage a third party public
intervention in municipal employment disputes but do allow the
parties to select a private mediator whose expenses are to be borne
by the parties themselves."8
C. Fact-Finding Procedures
Fact-finding procedures are available to municipal employees
and employers in over twenty states. 9 The fact that there is little
14. Kentucky, GERR 51:2611 RF-47.
15. Kansas, GERR 51:2511; California, GERR 51:1411.
16. California, GERR 51:1411.
17. Michigan, GERR 51:3111; Maine, GERR 51:2811.
18. California, GERR 51:1411; Idaho, GERR 51:2111; Washington, GERR 51:5611.
19. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
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uniformity among state laws reflects the diverse political and eco-
nomic factors which underlie state legislation.
The lack of congruity between the states on fact-finding legisla-
tion is due in significant part to each state's perception of the
collective bargaining process. States with a policy of encouraging
collective bargaining in the public sector tend to make fact-finding
available only after extensive efforts to negotiate a settlement have
been demonstrated. Specifically, those states that require the par-
ties to utilize mediation prior to petitioning for fact-finding are
attempting to insure that the parties make at least a visible effort
to bargain."0 Legislative provisions that specify that the impasse be
determined by the public agency administering the law prior to
acceptance of a fact-finding petition is another indication of the
intent to use fact-finding only as a last resort.2 1 Some states explic-
itly encourage the individual to first mediate the dispute for which
he has been selected or appointed as a fact finder.22 The insistence
on compliance with such stringent procedural prerequisites prior
to fact-finding is demonstrative of many legislatures' intention not
to use the fact finder's recommendation as the basis for further
bargaining. These strict procedures are geared to give the fact
finder's recommendations the quality of decisiveness and finality.
The attempt to influence the settlement of the dispute through
the pressure of public opinion is evidenced by legislation calling for
publication of the fact finder's report. 2 This report usually is
publicized a stated number of days after the principle parties have
received such report. Under some fact-finding procedures there is
a show cause court procedure whereby the parties are required to
present their respective positions to the appropriate legislative
body if the recommendations of the fact finder fail to result in an
agreement.24
Under two states' legislation, fact-finding is available upon re-
quest, without previous determination of impasse or mediation
effort required.25 The apparent purpose.of such fact-finding legisla-
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin. GERR 51:501 RF-
63.
20. Hawaii, GERR 51:2011; Massachusetts, GERR 51:3011; New York, GERR
51:4111.
21. Kansas, GERR 51:2511; Connecticut, GERR 51:1611.
22. Connecticut, GERR 51:1611; Montana, GERR 51:3511.
23. Hawaii, GERR 51:2011; Kansas, GERR 51:2511; Maine, GERR 51:2811; Mon-
tana, GERR 51:3511; New York, GERR 51:4111; Pennsylvania, GERR 51:4711.
24. Montana, GERR 51:3511; Kansas, GERR 51:2511; New York, GERR 51:4111.
25. Connecticut, GERR 51:1611; Maine, GERR 51:2811.
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tion is to provide a terminal procedure for dispute resolution. How-
ever, such easy accessibility to the fact-finding procedure can be
counter-productive. Under such circumstances there is a threat
that the disputants will wait for the fact finder's recommendations
in lieu of making serious efforts to bargain. Legislation which
explicitly prescribes further bargaining if the impasse continues
after the publication of the fact finder's report exemplifies the view
that fact-finding is merely an extension of the bargaining process.26
D. Voluntary Interest Arbitration
Voluntary interest arbitration involves a joint agreement be-
tween the employer and the union to submit specific collective
bargaining issues to a third party for a binding decision. Voluntary
arbitration is unlike compulsory arbitration in that the respective
parties are free to accept or reject this procedure as a means to
resolving a collective bargaining dispute. Voluntary arbitration is
also distinct from mediation and fact-finding in that it is not an
interim step in the collective bargaining process but is rather a
means of final determination of a contract dispute.
Voluntary arbitration is receiving increased attention as a dis-
pute settlement technique in the public sector. 2 The growing num-
ber of states which have provided for the use of a voluntary arbitra-
tion procedure may be an indication that this type of arbitration
is being more seriously considered as an effective municipal sector
dispute settlement device.28 In states where voluntary arbitration is
not provided for by formal legislation or case law, it is being
utilized on a limited basis by means of provisions in collective
bargaining agreements.
E. Compulsory Interest Arbitration Legislation
Several states provide for compulsory interest arbitration as a
means for the final resolution of collective bargaining disputes in
areas other than police and fire.29 The Maine statute governing all
municipal employees provides for mediation and fact-finding with
26. Maine, GERR 51:2811.
27. Staudohar, Voluntary Binding Arbitration in Public Employment, THE ARBITRA-
TION JOURNAL, 25:1 at 30-39 (1970).
28. Alaska, Delaware, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island.
GERR 51:501.
29. At least eight states have enacted compulsory arbitration statutes for firefighters
and/or policemen: Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Such separate legislation will not be considered in the
context of general municipal impasse procedures. GERR 51:501.
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recommendations prior to the aforementioned employees being
able to utilize binding interest arbitration. If the impasse is still
unresolved after the fact finder's report has been made, then either
party can petition for arbitration. The decision of the arbitration
board is binding as to all matters other than those relating to
salaries, pensions and insurance." Rhode Island has a similar
statute covering municipal employees which provides for binding
arbitration of all unresolved collective bargaining disputes "not
involving expenditure of money. ' 31
Under Nevada law, parties can mutually agree that the findings
and recommendations of the fact finder will be final and binding.
If the parties do not so agree, then either one of the parties, prior
to fact-finding, may request the governor to order that the fact-
finder's report and recommendations on any or all issues be final
and binding. The governor exercises this power on a case-by-case
basis and his evaluation is made in consideration of the best inter-
ests of the state and all its citizens, the possible fiscal impact both
within and outside political subdivisions and potential danger to
the safety of the people of the state or political subdivision.
F. Right-To-Strike Legislation
Seven states, namely, Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Vermont, have extended a limited right
to strike to some or all of their municipal employees.3 A variety
of legislative measures have evolved but common legislative con-
cern for the protection of the public health, safety and welfare has
produced markedly similar statutory procedures geared to qualify
and limit the employees' right to strike.
Right-to-strike legislation could more accurately be described
as strike restriction legislation. All of the states except Montana
require labor and management to exhaust a series of impasse pro-
cedures before a legal strike is allowable. The mandatory use of
such a sequence of settlement devices clearly demonstrates that
legislators see the strike as a last resort, not a preferred dispute
resolution technique.
30. Maine, GERR 51:2811.
31. Rhode Island, GERR 51:4811.
32. Nevada, GERR 51:3711.
33. For a detailed discussion of the right to strike legislation, see A. ABOUD and G.
ABOUD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, New York State School of In-
dustrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York (1974).
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In six states34 mediation must be used by the parties after an
impasse has been reached. In most instances the law charges the
parties to bargain in good faith or to negotiate for a reasonable
period of time prior to requesting mediation. Several states also
specifically require that mediation efforts continue for a stated
number of days. The statutory insistence upon pre-mediation bar-
gaining and a required time period for mediation efforts reflects a
legislative preference for negotiated settlements. Such rigid timeta-
bles and procedures surrounding the use of mediation in "right-to-
strike" legislation appear to be necessary to keep mediation from
being a mere perfunctory hurdle in the path to a strike.
Mandatory fact-finding is the next device used in attempting to
resolve a dispute prior to the use of the strike. Only if the impasse
persists after mediation, may the parties petition for fact-
finding.35 Once the fact-finding panel has been appointed, the fact
finder or fact-finding panehhas a stated number of days to submit
a report. The technical complexity and rigid timetables which char-
acterize the fact-finding procedure at this stage may be another
reason to encourage negotiated settlements. Further delays in the
strike effort are built into the procedural machinery by requiring
that no strike action take place within a stated period after publica-
tion of the fact finder's report." Several states prescribe a ten day
notice of the intent to strike, yet another device to forestall the use
of the strike weapon.3 1
Voluntary binding arbitration is made available to the parties
in all the states allowing the strike, usually after mediation or fact-
finding efforts have failed. Under certain state legislation38 the
parties may submit the dispute to binding arbitration at any time
during the negotiations.
Several states limit by legislative definition the types of em-
ployees who may legally strike. Pennsylvania prohibits police and
fire-fighters from striking but has a compulsory arbitration statute
covering such personnel. 39 Montana law covers only nurses in
34. Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Vermont. GERR 51:501
RF-63.
35. The parties may initiate the strike action without fact-finding in Alaska and Minne-
sota but such activity would still be subject to court injunction if it would threaten the
public's health, safety and welfare.
36. Vermont, GERR 51:5411; Oregon, GERR 51:4611; Hawaii, GERR 51:2011.
37. Oregon and Hawaii require ten day notices. Montana law, although it has no
mandatory impasse procedures, requires that employees give thirty days notice of their
intent to strike.
38. Alaska, GERR 51:1111; New Jersey, GERR 51:3911; Oregon, GERR 51:4611.
39. Pennsylvania, GERR 51:4711.
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health care facilities and has no procedural devices for "the de-
fusing" of a dispute prior to a strike.'" Alaska divides public em-
ployees into three categories.4 The first group, employees "whose
services may not be given up for even the shortest period of time,"
are not allowed to strike. This group includes policemen, firemen,
prison guards and hospital employees. The second group, those
employees "who may stop working for a period of time but not for
an indefinite period of time," consists of public utility and sanita-
tion workers, snow removal personnel and school employees.
These employees may strike after mediation attempts have failed
and it has been ascertained that such a strike will not threaten the
public health, safety and welfare. The third group consists of all
other public employees, which employees have an unlimited right-
to-strike if they first exhaust mediation procedures. An interesting
feature of the Alaska legislation is the strike vote-a device bor-
rowed from the private sector to insure that the strike is the prefer-
ence of the unit membership. Employees in the second group may
strike only when a majority of the unit votes by secret ballot to do
so. Minnesota restricts the right to strike to "non-essential em-
ployees," those employees whose services do not threaten the pub-
lic health, safety and welfare." Furthermore, the right-to-strike is
limited to situations in which the employer does not submit to
arbitration after mediation and fact-finding has failed, or refuses
to implement an arbitration award it had previously agreed to
accept.
In all seven states with right-to-strike legislation, except Mon-
tana, the right to strike is subject to court injunction even after the
complicated and tedious procedural requirements for a legal strike
have been met. The highly complex and intangible factors which
affect the "public health, safety and welfare," and which provide
the basis for an evaluation of "essential employees and services,"
are not easily and uniformly identifiable. The legislative criteria for
enjoining a strike-threats to the public health, safety and wel-
fare-are vague and cause the law to be unevenly enforced by the
judiciary. Hawaii's limitation of the criteria for enjoining strikes
40. Montana, GERR 51:3511.
41. Alaska, GERR 51:1111.
42. Minnesota, GERR 51:3211. The Minnesota Public Employment Relations Board
has the power and duty to determine that employees are "essential" and hence have no right
to strike if the Board judges that such employees' duties involve work or services essential
to the health or safety of the public and the withholding of such services would create a
clear and present danger to the health or safety of the public.
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to "threats to the public health and safety," deleting "welfare," is
somewhat more restrictive but still very unpredictable. Montana's
operational definition of public health and safety in terms of acces-
sibility to health care facilities displaces judicial discretion as the
determinate factor in allowing strikes in that state. Under the
current right-to-strike legislation found in the aforementioned
seven states, the public health, safety and welfare are not defined,
nor have legislatures set up criteria by which such interests are to
be determined.
It should be carefully noted that only Pennsylvania, of the
seven states that have enacted right-to-strike legislation, experi-
enced significant strike activity prior to passing such legislation.43
In fact, before Pennsylvania's passage of its right-to-strike legisla-
tion, the "Governor's Commission to Revise the Public Employee
Laws of Pennsylvania" stated in its report that, "The collective
bargaining process will be strengthened if [the] qualified right to
strike is recognized. . . In short we look upon the limited and
carefully defined right to strike as a safety value that will in fact
prevent strikes."44 Thus, it is apparent that the Governor's Com-
mission was attempting to find viable solutions to the same ques-
tion that is currently before the Wisconsin State Legislative Com-
mittee formed in July of 1974; namely, what is the best method for
resolving collective bargaining impasses in municipal employment?
Therefore, let us now examine the provisions of the Pennsylvania
law to see how that state has attempted to facilitate impasse resolu-
tion.
1. The Pennsylvania Act
Enacted in 1970, the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations
Act (PERA) 5 grants a qualified right to strike to all municipal
43. STRIKES IN PENNSYLVANIA (1966-70)
Type 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
All workers a 4 -10 13 38 29
Teachers b - 7 4 26 11
(a) Source: U.S. Department of Labor, State Profiles: Current Status of Public Labor
Relations (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1971).
(b) Source: Statement, Pennsylvania State Education Association before Pennsylvania
House-Senate Committee on Act 195, May 17, 1973. Quoted in ABOUD and ABOUt at 22,
note 33 supra.
44. Report and Recommendation of June 1968, Governor's Commission to Revise the
Public Employee Laws of Pennsylvania at 14.
45. Pennsylvania, GERR 51:4711.
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(including teachers) and state employees, except police and firemen
who are covered under another statute. The police and firemen are
prohibited from striking under any circumstances but have access
to compulsory binding arbitration as a final impasse procedure.
The Pennsylvania legislation requires that detailed impasse
procedures be exhausted before a strike can be legalized. If nego-
tiations do not result in an agreement after twenty-one days or
within a period no later than one hundred and fifty days before the
employer's "budget submission date," both parties are required by
law to make written request for mediation services from the Penn-
sylvania Bureau of Mediation. If no settlement is reached after
twenty days of mediation or within one hundred and thirty days
prior to the twenty days of mediation or within one hundred and
thirty days prior to the employer's budget submission date the
Bureau of Mediation must so inform the Pennslvania Labor Rela-
tions Board, the state agency responsible for the administration of
the Act. The Board then may appoint a fact finder or a three
member fact-finding panel to hold a hearing and make written
findings of fact and recommendations must be made to the Board
and the parties within forty days after the notification of the failure
of mediation. The parties must accept or reject the fact finder's
recommendations but if they are not accepted within ten days such
recommendations are made public. The parties are required to
notify the Board and each other of their final acceptance or rejec-
tion of such recommendations within five to ten days after publica-
tion. The full cost of mediation and half the cost of the fact-finding
is paid by the state, the remaining costs being divided equally
between the parties. Any failure of the parties to submit to the
statutorily required mediation or fact-finding is considered a re-
fusal to bargain in good faith, subjecting the delinquent party to
an unfair labor practice charge.
The Pennsylvania law further provides that public employees
other than police and fire personnel, court house employees and
guards of prisons and mental hospitals, may strike under certain
limited circumstances. First, as noted previously, the statutory re-
quirements of negotiation, mediation and fact-finding must be ful-
filled as procedural conditions. Second, the strike must not create
a clear and present danger or threat to the public's health, safety
or welfare. If the above noted conditions are met, the employees
are then free to engage in strike activity. Employer unfair labor
practices however are expressly excluded as justification for an
unlawful strike. Instead, the Act provides for expedited procedures
[Vol. 58
RIGHT-TO-STRIKE
to investigate and resolve an unfair labor practice charge made
during the impasse proceedings.
Pennsylvania law prescribes no direct penalties for an illegal
strike but the employer can bring contempt charges against em-
ployees refusing to comply with court orders. Employees convicted
of contempt of court can legally be suspended, demoted or dis-
charged by their employer. Both employees and labor organiza-
tions guilty of contempt are subject to court imposed fines, which
fines are determined by the gravity of the illegal act and the ability
of the parties to pay.
Pennsylvania's prior experience with a wide variety of illegal
strikes in the public sector is reflected in its legislative provisions
on sympathy strikes and secondary boycotting. The Act makes it
a prohibited practice for public employees, not on strike, to honor
picket lines set up by another group of employees and subjects such
employees to fines and discharge penalties." This legislation, while
recognizing employees' right to strike over a dispute directly re-
lated to their interests, attempts to avoid massive sympathy strikes
which could paralyze a municipality.
In language similar to the Taft-Hartley legislation in the pri-
vate sector, the Pennsylvania law makes a strike or boycott against
a public employer over a jurisdictional matter an unfair labor
practice. 7 The law also prohibits any employee or employee organ-
ization from attempting to influence other employees to force a
public employer to boycott another business or to recognize an
uncertified employee organization."
46. Section 1101 of Pennsylvania Public Employment Relations Act, PA. STAT. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1101 (1970):
PICKETING. Public employes, other than those engaged in a non-prohibited strike,
who refuse to cross a picket line shall be deemed to be engaged in a prohibited strike
and shall be subject to the terms and conditions of Article X pertaining to prohibited
strikes.
GERR 51:4711.
47. Section 1101 of Pennsylvania Public Employment Relations Act, PA. STAT. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1201 (1970):
(b) Employe organizations, their agents, or representatives, or public employes
are prohibited from: (7) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual
employed by any person to engage in a strike or refusal to handle goods or perform
services; or threatening, coercing or restraining any person where an object thereof
is to (i) force or require any public employer to cease dealing or doing business with
any other person or (ii) force or require a public employer to recognize for represen-





G. Combination Right-to-Strike and Compulsory Interest
Arbitration Legislation
I. The Canadian Plan
One of the forms of compulsory interest arbitration which has
received copious amounts of publicity in recent years is the "Cana-
dian Plan," a part of the Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967
covering labor relations in the Canadian Federal Service." Under
this law, employees have a choice of the process for resolution of
their collective bargaining dispute. The labor organization must
choose one of two procedures for resolving an impasse situation:
(1) conciliation which includes the right to strike if conciliation
efforts fail; (2) final and binding arbitration if a negotiated agree-
ment cannot be reached. The choice of an impasse resolution pro-
cedure must be made by the labor organization before any bargain-
ing takes place. Under both procedures, however, the parties must
first bargain in good faith prior to the actual utilization of the
chosen procedure. Also, under both procedures, conciliation serv-
ices are available at any time during the negotiations. If the labor
organization has elected to take the conciliation (right-to-strike)
option and agreement has not been reached after preliminary con-
ciliation efforts have been made, a formal conciliation board may
then be appointed. This body acts as a fact-finding board and
issues its recommendations to the parties. If the parties cannot
agree after such recommendations, the union is then free to strike.
It should be carefully noted that the right to strike is not given
to all employees. The Public Service Staff Relations Board desig-
nates which employees shall be prohibited from striking. Employ-
ees are forbidden to strike if their jobs consist, in whole or in part,
of duties, the performance of which at any particular time or after
any specific period of time, is or will be necessary to the safety or
security of the public. The percentage of employees so designated
in any given unit can be a factor which could directly influence the
union's ability to effectively use the strike weapon. The result is
that the right to strike under the "Canadian Plan" is not without
qualifications; only "non-designated" employees may strike and
then only after the required impasse procedures have been utilized.
If the labor organization takes the arbitration option, it loses
its right to strike. If conciliation efforts fail and the parties remain
49. For a complete study of labor relations in Canada see H. W. ARTHURS, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN CANADA: FIVE MODELS, Institute of Labor and
Industrial Relations, University of Michigan-Wayne State University (1971).
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at impasse, either or both the parties may request final and binding
arbitration. However, the scope of the final and binding arbitration
is not unlimited. Conditions of employment not directly related to
rates of pay, hours of work, leave entitlement, and standards of
discipline are subject to arbitration. However, the processes gov-
erning appointment, transfer, promotion, demotion, lay-off, dis-
charge, discipline and classification are not arbitrable.
2. The Oregon Plan
Oregon has one of the most comprehensive public employee
bargaining laws in the United States." All Oregon public employ-
ees are covered except policemen, firemen, and guards at prisons
and mental institutions. Statutory insistence upon a reasonable
period of negotiations prior to mediation and the rigid timetable
and procedures required for mediation and fact-finding makes the
statute similar to other right-to-strike legislation. In a further at-
tempt to bring public pressure on the parties, the statute specifi-
cally requires that a fact-finding report be publicized five days after
it is received by the parties. At any time during the negotiations
or subsequent impasse procedures the parties may submit the dis-
pute to voluntary binding arbitration.
The right to strike is limited to employees whose bargaining
unit has been certified by the Oregon Public Employment Rela-
tions Board. The municipal employer and employees of the afore-
mentioned certified units must not have previously agreed to re-
solve the impasse by voluntary binding arbitration. A thirty day
"cooling off" period after publication of the fact finder's report is
required and a ten day notice of the intent to strike must be given
to the public employer and the Board. The statute allows the public
employer to petition the circuit court for an injunction against the
strike when it "creates a clear and present danger or threat to the
health, safety or welfare of the public."
Now that we have surveyed existing impasse resolution proce-
dures in Wisconsin and in other states, we will now focus our
attention on proposed legislation relating to resolution of collective
bargaining disputes.
50. Oregon, GERR 51:4611.
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IV. PROPOSED IMPASSE RESOLUTION LEGISLATION
A. Proposed Federal Right-to-Strike Legislation-
The Clay-Perkins Bill
I. General Provisions
One of the most discussed congressional proposals for a na-
tional law establishing collective bargaining rights for state and
local government employees" is House of Representatives bill
8677, also known as the Clay-Perkins bill.5"
This bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in
1973 by Representatives William Clay (Democrat-Missouri) and
Henry Perkins (Democrat-Kentucky) and is endorsed by the Coali-
tion of American Public Employees, whose members include the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
the National Education Association, the International Association
of Fiiefighters, and the National Treasury Employees Union. In-
cluded in the bill are all of the provisions public employee unions
have endeavored to enact in state labor legislation. Under the bill,
organization and collective bargaining rights would be established
for public employees, with mandatory agency shop provisions in-
cluded. Supervisors would be permitted to organize and bargain
but not-in the same unit as non-supervisors. The scope of bargain-
ing would be very broad, requiring bargaining over "conditions of
51. Presently there is no comprehensive federal legislation covering state and
local employees and the question whether public employee relations should be under
federal rather than state legislation has become a controversial issue in itself. It is
argued that local government labor relations legislation should be allowed to evolve
in response to historical and political preference on the state level. The counter
argument is that the vast difference in public employee labor legislation from state
to state creates unrest among public employees. Compromise solutions have been
formulated which propose a more flexible federal-state system whereby the states
would be given a chance to develop their own legislation.
Address by Robert Helsby to conference of American Association of Arbitrators and
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, May 29, 1974. GERR (no. 557, E-l).
52. Another bill, H.R. 9730, introduced by Rep. Frank Thompson, Jr. (D.-N.J.), would
merely repeal the present Taft-Hartley exemption for employees of state and local govern-
ment, thereby making them subject to Taft-Hartley and the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board. This bill would significantly change public labor relations in several
aspects. Since § 7 of the Taft-Hartley bill protects the right to engage in concerted activities,
which of course includes the strike, enactment of this legislation would give public employ-
ees a clear right to strike. Furthermore, mediation and fact-finding, impasse resolution
techniques which have become a mandatory part of much public employee labor relations
legislation, would be relegated to voluntary procedures. This proposal, which would bring
all American employees, public and private, under one national labor policy is premised




employment and other matters of mutual concern related thereto."
Also included in the bill is an access clause which guarantees a
union's right to use employer's facilities for an incumbent union's
business. Contrariwise, the bill severely restricts access and usage
of such facilities to union organizations challenging the incumbent
union. The proposed bill would be administered by a new agency,
the National Public Employment Relations Board.
2. Impasse Resolution Procedures
Under the Clay-Perkins proposal, either party may request
mediation from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service if
a collective bargaining impasse has been reached. If an impasse is
certified by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, a
mediator is then appointed. If after fifteen days the mediator is
unable to effect a settlement, either party would have the right to
request fact-finding, including written recommendations by a fact
finder. The fact finder's recommendations would be advisory only,
unless within five days after giving or receiving the fact-finding
request, the union notifies the employer in writing that it desires
that the fact finder's recommendations be binding. If the union
does not request that the fact finder's recommendations be binding
on the parties, those recommendations are then privately submit-
ted in writing to the parties and the Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service. Subsequently, either the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, the fact finder, the employer or the union
may then make such findings and recommendations public if the
dispute is not settled within ten days after the receipt of said find-
ings and recommendations from the fact finder.
If the union has not requested that the fact finder's recommen-
dations be binding upon both the employer and the union, the
union has the right to participate in a strike rising out of or in
connection with a labor dispute. The strike may be enjoined only
on the basis of a finding that it poses a clear and present danger
to the public health or safety. The union may also be enjoined by
the court from striking if it has failed to make a reasonable effort
to utilize the mediation and fact-finding procedures provided for
in the act.
B. Proposed State of Wisconsin Legislation-Assembly Bill 758
The Wisconsin Council of County and Municipal Employees,
District Council 48 of the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees and the Wisconsin Education Council
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introduced Assembly Bill 758 on March 28, 1973. Its provisions
allow employees the option to strike or request compulsory arbi-
tration thereby making it similar in that respect to the above de-
scribed "Canadian Plan". The arbitration provisions of the bill are
in large part patterned after the Wisconsin arbitration statute for
law enforcement and firefighter personnel.
Assembly Bill 758 would not replace the existing comprehen-
sive municipal labor statute (MERA) but would significantly
change the impasse resolution procedures existing under the law.
The right to strike would be added to present municipal employee
rights and that right could be exercised after certain mediation and
notice requirements are fulfilled in accordance with appropriate
rules adopted by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion. All municipal and county employees would have the right to
strike except law enforcement personnel and firefighters who
would continue to be covered under present special legislation for
these groups. The alternative to the strike under Bill 758 is final
and binding arbitration. At the time the union gives notice of its
intention to begin negotiations on a new contract, or reopen an
existing contract, it must certify to the employer and the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission whether, in the event of a
deadlock in negotiations, it will strike or submit the issues in dis-
pute to binding arbitration.
Under the arbitration alternative, two forms of arbitration are
available. Under the first form, if the parties consent, the arbitra-
tor may determine all the issues in dispute. If the parties do not
so agree then the second form is used. Form two provides that the
arbitrator will select the final offer of one of the parties. The
criteria to guide the arbitrator in his decision are the same as under
the present police and fire arbitration statute.53
53. WIS. STAT. § 111.77(6) (1971), applicable to collective bargaining units composed
of law enforcement personnel and firefighters, provides as follows:
In reaching a decision the arbitrator shall give weight to the following factors:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the unit of
government to meet these costs.
(d) Comparisons of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the em-
ployes involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions
of employment of other employes performing similar services and with other em-
ployes generally:
1. In public employment in comparable communities.
2. In private employment in comparable communities.




Bill 758 establishes a time schedule for contract re-openings
and requires a reasonable period of negotiations and mediation.
The parties would be able to utilize voluntary binding arbitration
and there is a requirement of reasonable notice of the intent to
strike.
Prior to a presentation of an evaluation on the above described
legislative impasse resolution procedures, let us first examine the
unique political context of municipal labor relations vis-a-vis labor
relations in the private sector.
V. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION-WHO HOLDS THE POWER?
A. Bargaining in Municipal Employment
Many of the traditional concepts of bargaining developed in the
private sector are not applicable in the municipal sector. The par-
ties to municipal bargaining are not limited by the private sector
constraints of prices, market competition and profits. The private
employer's response to employee wage demands will always be
made within the parameters of profitability. The elected officials
will approach and consider requests for employee wage demands,
not so much on the basis of economic motives, but rather by weigh-
ing their decision with the anticipated political support for that
decision. The revenues to support the increased wage package,
local taxes, are not derived from cold economic market factors.
What is defined in the private sector as pure economics-the mon-
etary wage package-becomes a highly controversial political issue
in the municipal sector.54
B. Identification of the Interest Groups
If we accept the "normal American political process"55 as the
(f) The overall compensation presently received by the employed, including direct
wage compensation, vacation, holidays and excused time, insurance and pensions,
medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of employment, and
all other benefits received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the
arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other facts, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or tradition-
ally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of
employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbi-
tration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in private employ-
ment.
54. This examination of the political context of municipal labor relations is at best a
brief exposition of the political factor which is always present in the world of municipal
labor relations. Any in-depth analysis of the political processes found within the municipal
labor relations context is certainly beyond the scope of this article and would seem to be
more appropriately within the technical ambit of social scientists.
55. R. A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DENMOCRATIC THEORY 145 (1956) defines the normal
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locus within which municipal employment bargaining takes place,
we have to identify the interest groups in the bargaining relation-
ship. The two principals to the bargaining, the elected offi-
cials/municipal employer and the employee organization, are most
clearly defined and isolated. The third interest group, more diffi-
cult to circumscribe and identify during the-bargaining process, is
the public. It is not strictly speaking an "interest group" in the
sense that it has a limited and specifically stated goal but the force
of public opinion is often an essential factor in determining the
bargaining power of the two principals. A fourth group, the courts
and arbitrators, are parties normally outside the municipal bar-
gaining and political process but who are on occasion interjected
into that process. Ordinarily, in municipal government no one
group has "the power". So long as the power is balanced among
the elected officials and the union they will be encouraged to nego-
tiate and engage in bargaining to their mutual benefit. Neither
party will be able to unilaterally impose terms of a contract upon
the other so long as the public is a factor in the final agreement.
The public's interest in responsible municipal fiscal policy and its
concern about the tax rate in the community provides elected offi-
cials with a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the employees'
collectii'e bargaining representative. On the other hand, the munic-
ipal union's bargaining position is supported by the public's need
for the continuation of efficient government services. Neither of
the two principals operate in a vacuum; both depend upon the
support of the public for their bargaining power. Although the
public is not a direct party to the negotiations, the final agreement
between the municipal employer and the municipal union is in
significant part the expression of the will of that public.
1. Municipal Employer
Elected boards and officials on the municipal level have often
been characterized as having potentially unlimited power over
local fiscal matters and the formation of public policy. The more
correct statement would be that the electorate hypothetically has
unlimited control over the elected officials and, hence, over the
decisions affecting municipal government. The relatively short
term of municipal officials, usually two to four years, helps insure
that their decisions will be made with one eye on their chances in
American political process as one in which there is a high probability that an active and
legitimate group in.the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage
in the process of decision.
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the upcoming election. This system of linking the actions of public
officeholders to the ballot box politicizes decisions which in an-
other context would be purely economic. The uncertainty of elected
officials' political future keeps them closely tethered to the public's
preferences. Elected officials are required to walk a fine line,
guarding against unnecessary public expenditures and taxes on one
hand but alert to the need for adequate services to the community
on the other.
By the very nature of the political process, the municipal em-
ployer cannot act in a vacuum. The municipal employer, as an
interest group, can dominate only in a situation where the munici-
pal bargaining process does not function properly. Prior to the
enactment of legislation giving municipal employees the right to
join labor organizations, it might have been argued that the munic-
ipal employers had the lion's share in the decision making process.
Clearly, if labor organizations-the countervailing interest group
in the municipal bargaining process-were prohibited by law, there
potentially could be a misallocation of bargaining power. How-
ever, the potential for such a misallocation has been greatly re-
duced by Wisconsin's present comprehensive labor law and the
rapid growth of municipal unions.
2. Municipal Labor Organization
Municipal unions have had to change the bargaining tactics and
techniques developed by their trade and industrial union cousins in
the private sector. Traditionally, private sector unions have not
become involved in local politics but have concentrated their politi-
cal and lobbying activity on the federal level. Contrariwise, be-
cause control over wages and working conditions of municipal
employees is affected by state legislation and local government
policies, municipal unions have placed a much greater emphasis
upon state and local political activity. Municipal unions have real-
ized that employee wage demands are just one of many made upon
the public purse and that in order to get their piece of the pie they
have to engage in the municipal bargaining process. The public's
concern for adequate community services and support for reasona-
ble wage requests carl give the union an enviable bargaining posi-
tion. Municipal unions and their members, by utilizing local poli-
tics as a bargaining tool, have a power option not enjoyed by
private sector unions. These municipal unions, by participating in
the political bargaining process, can develop a bargaining weapon
comparable to the right to strike enjoyed by employees in the
private sector. However, granting the right to strike to municipal
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employees has been questioned on the basis that it would give that
interest group a favored position among other interest groups in
the municipality.
What is wrong with strikes in public employment is that because
they disrupt essential services, a large part of a mayor's political
constituency will press for a quick end to ihe strike with little
concern for the cost of the settlement. The problem is that be-
cause market restraints are attenuated and because public em-
ployee strikes cause inconvenience to voters, such strikes too
often succeed. Since other interest groups with conflicting claims
on municipal government do not, as a general proposition, have
anything approaching the effectiveness of this union tech-
nique-or at least cannot maintain this relative degree of power
over the long run-they are put at a significant competitive dis-
advantage in the political process. Where this is the case, it must
be said that the political process has been radically altered. And
because of the deceptive simplicity of the analogy to collective
bargaining in the private sector, the alteration may take place
without anyone realizing what has happened. 6
Similarly, granting the municipal union the power to impose
final and binding interest arbitration on the municipal employer
would appear to be subject to the same critique, i.e., that the union
would be able to distort the normal political process. This power
would enable the union to sidestep the municipal bargaining and
political process and substitute the decision of an outside arbitrator
for the will of the public. Although the union would not be in a
position to unilaterally determine its members' financial gain, it
could effectively remove the decision making power from its nor-
mal context. Compulsory binding interest arbitration could create
an imbalance in the municipal power structure and pre-empt the
right of the public to determine its fiscal priorities.
3. Public
The public, that general body of citizens for whose benefit
government services are provided, is the ultimate decision maker
in the municipal bargaining process. In that process, the support
of the public tips the scales either for the municipal employer or
for the employee organization. Both principal parties are straw
men without the support of the general public. Since the municipal
government officials are the elected representatives of the public,
56. Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
78 YALE L. J. 1107, 1124 (1969).
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their political future depends on how well they reflect the public's
interest in bargaining with various interest groups. The elected
officials' concern should be to carry out the intent and design of
the public. The concern of the municipal union is to present its
demands in a fashion acceptable to and compatible with the pub-
lic's wishes. Decisions made by elected officials without public
support must be distinguished from those made with full support
of the public. The difference between the two is fundamental.
Elected officials are frequently blamed for their refusal to submit
to the municipal union's demands. Such criticism is valid only if
they are acting contrary to the public's wishes. If the elected offi-
cials are acting in accord with the wishes of the public, their actions
are quite defensible. Conversely, if the public supports the munici-
pal union's proposals, the elected officials' acceptance of these
proposals is also politically defensible.
4. Courts and Arbitrators
The function of the courts in the municipal bargaining process
is unpredictable and varies from one jurisdiction to another. For
example, under Oregon law the courts can determine under what
conditions the strike is legally allowable and ultimately whether to
impose compulsory interest arbitration upon the municipal
employer and the union. In many right-to-strike states the courts
decide whether the public health, safety and welfare would be
threatened by a strike and thereby determine when the right to
strike should be granted.17 In several states with no right to strike,
the courts have followed the policy that the strike will not be
enjoined in the absence of a showing of irreparable harm.58 By
applying the private sector anti-injunction statute to public em-
ployees, the courts have demonstrated their willingness to partici-
pate in the municipal government's decision making process.
In Wisconsin the question of whether an illegal strike is, per
se, enjoinable by reason of the fact it has been declared illegal by
statute or judicial decision, has not been finally determined. In
University of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Teaching Assistants
Assoc.,59 Dane County Circuit Judge William Sachtjen held that
57. Alaska, GERR 51:1111; Hawaii, GERR 51:2011; Minnesota, GERR 51:3211; Ore-
gon, GERR 51:4611; Pennsylvania, GERR 51:4711; Vermont, GERR 51:5411.
58. Michigan, School District of City of Holland v. Holland Education Association, 380
Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968); Rhode Island, School Committee of the Town of
Westerley v. Westerley Teachers Association, 299 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1973).
59. GERR 346:B7, Civil No. 130-095, Dane Co. Cir. Ct. (1970).
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it was not necessary to prove that actual harm had been caused in
order to justify the granting of an injunction. Contrariwise, in
City of West Allis v. West Allis-West Milwaukee Education
Association,"0 Circuit Judge William I. O'Neil refused to grant an
injunction in the absence of any showing of violence or disruption
of the orderly conduct of the affairs of the municipality.
Although the court's statutory role differs from state to state,
it appears that courts have been exercising more discretion in issu-
ing injunctions and have been more actively involved in attempting
to mediate collective bargaining disputes. These developments re-
flect a growing tendency of the courts to become more vigorously
enmeshed in the municipal bargaining process.
An arbitrator in a compulsory final and binding interest arbi-
tration situation performs a function quite similar to the courts by
providing a decision from without the municipal bargaining sys-
tem. As an outside party, the arbitrator may be able to view the
collective bargaining dispute more objectively than the interested
parties and consequently be able to issue an award which they
would find at least palatable. On the other hand, an arbitrator who
is not as aware of the intricacies of the dispute as are the parties,
may render a decision which neither management nor the union
could tolerate due to its total impracticability. Finally, an arbitra-
tor's award which establishes the municipal employees' level of
remuneration often adversely affects the elected officials' and ulti-
mately the public's ability to select and order the municipality's
fiscal priorities.
Now that we have briefly examined the political environment
within which municipal labor relations functions, let us now pro-
ceed to evaluate the previously described legislative impasse resolu-
tion procedures, while keeping in mind the political interaction
with those procedures.
VI. EVALUATION OF LEGISLATIVE IMPASSE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES
A. Evaluation of Wisconsin Legislation
1. Mediation under Wisconsin Law
The fact that mediation is provided in the event of an impasse
between a municipal employer and employee union in over half of
the fifty states reflects the acceptance this impasse resolution pro-
60. Civil No. 386-591, Milw. Co. Cir. Ct. (1971).
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cedure has gained in the municipal labor relations sector through-
out the country." Its potential to encourage and mature the collec-
tive bargaining process recommends it not only as an impasse
procedure but also as a tool for educating parties inexperienced in
bargaining. In that its primary purpose is to aid the parties in
achieving a voluntary and mutually acceptable agreement, media-
tion is more properly characterized as an extension of, rather than
a substitute for, collective bargaining.
The mediator can perform several different functions. He may
be able to convey additional information to the parties, helping
each side arrive at a more realistic estimation of the other's true
position. He may try to persuade the parties that they have incor-
rectly estimated the benefits of agreement or the costs of disagree-
ment. Mediation also provides a face-saving mechanism for one or
both parties when they have become locked into a position from
which there seems no graceful retreat. The involvement of the
mediator provides the parties with a means of rationalizing pre-
viously held positions. Finally, a creative mediator can frequently
offer compromise solutions that have not occurred to either of the
parties, or which neither party, as a matter of principle, can pro-
pose. The potential for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement
coupled with a minimal risk of injury to the parties has made
mediation the least controversial of the impasse procedures devel-
oped in the public sector.
In Wisconsin the steady annual increase in the number of re-
quests for mediation over the last decade testifies to the willingness
of the parties to utilize this procedure.12 The continued high percen-
61. GERR 51:501.
62. Mediation Requests Fact-Finding
Received per Year Strikes per Year Requests per Year
1964-65 16 2 26
1965-66 41 2 35
1966-67 47 3 26
1967-68 63 4 46
1968-69 89 12 74
1969-70 147 13 114
1970-71 149 13 82
1971-72 177 5 69
1972-73 214 21 35
1973-74 211 27 34
115-4 TO 541
Compiled from annual reports of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. The
statistics are based on fiscal years beginning July 1 and ending June 30.
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tage of disputes which are settled through mediation, without re-
sort to the strike, is one of the brighter aspects of municipal labor
relations all too often passed over and forgotten. 3 Even when
strikes do occur, the impasse is invariably resolved by a renewed
bargaining effort by the parties. Frequently, the renewed bargain-
ing is coupled with the help of a mediator.
Mediation, since it is geared to continue the bargaining process
and not become a substitute for it, is consistent with the wider
scope of bargaining combined with municipal politics which was
described in the previous section of this article. Giving parties the
right to use mediation favors no one specific group nor does it
increase or decrease pre-existing power positions. As a procedure
designed to facilitate the bargaining process between the parties,
its goal is to operate within the given political power structure
rather than to alter it. Mediation is not only consistent with the
normal functioning of municipal government but can foster the
development of efficient and responsible decision making in local
politics.
2. Fact-Finding under Wisconsin Law
Theoretically, fact-finding in its final stages is a strike substi-
tute procedure by which disputed issues are set forth, analyzed and
presented to the municipal employer and the union by the fact
finder along with his recommendation for settlement. The fact-
finding process was designed to allow both parties, the municipal
employer (elected officials) and the municipal union, to test the
public support for their position by citing the fact finder's recom-
mendations as justification for their bargaining posture. Suppos-
edly, neither the elected officials nor the union are placed in a
decision-making position without the support of the public, the
ultimate employer.
However, the increase in the number of municipal employee
strikes raises doubts about the effectiveness of fact-finding as an
alternative to strike. The number of fact-finding petitions over the
past five years has significantly decreased, while the number of
municipal strikes has risen sharply. 4 This factual reality has raised
63. A comparison of the number of cases settled through mediation with the number
of strikes reveals that in the past ten years over ninety percent of all mediation cases were
resolved without resort to strikes, and over fifty percent of the disputes were resolved
without resorting to fact-finding. Id.




serious questions regarding fact-finding's effectiveness as a strike
alternative and as an impasse resolution technique. While a portion
of the decrease in the total number of fact-finding petitions initi-
ated after November 11, 1971 can be attributed to the exclusion
of law enforcement personnel and firefighters from fact-finding
procedures subsequent to that date, this fact does not account for
the dramatic reduction in the utilization of this procedure.
The conclusion that fact-finding is falling into a state of relative
atrophy is without question. However, the reasons for this phe-
nomena are difficult to ascertain with any sort of precision. What
rationale in the collective minds of the parties that causes them not
to utilize fact-finding either as a dispute resolution mechanism
and/or as a substitute for a strike is susceptible at this time only
to speculation. Without entering into a prolonged discourse on the
genesis of the relative disuse of fact-finding, there is one seemingly
plausible explanation for its decrease.
Fact-finding as a theoretical model was intended to allow a
neutral third party to objectively analyze dispute matters and then
come forward with non-binding recommendations for their resolu-
tion. The fact finder's recommendations can then be made public
by either party. It was thought that by permitting the fact finder's
recommendations to be made public that either the municipal em-
ployer or the union would be able to rally the citizenry of a munici-
pality to put pressure on one or both of the aforementioned parties
to accept those recommendations. However, in many instances the
fact finder's recommendations have little or no effect on an apa-
thetic citizenry, resulting in the removal or diminuation of public
pressure as an essential element in the fact-finding machinery. This
result many times causes unions to reject this mechanism as either
a substitute for strikes or as an effective impasse resolution tech-
nique.
3. Compulsory Final and Binding Interest Arbitration under
Wisconsin Law
As noted previously in this article, compulsory final and bind-
ing interest arbitration is statutorily available only to law enforce-
ment personnel and firefighters.65 The aforesaid statute allows ei-
ther the municipal employer or the union to file for arbitration.
Wisconsin's experience with the above described arbitration
65. For a preliminary report of an extensive study of police and firefighter interest
arbitration in Wisconsin, see J. Stern, Final-Offer Arbitration-Initial Experience in
Wisconsin, 97 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, No. 9 at 39-42 (Sept., 1974).
19751
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
suggests that it is compatible with collective bargaining and has not
hindered the achievement of negotiated settlements. In about two-
thirds of the 173 negotiations in 1973, the parties reached agree-
ment without mediation. In the remaining one-third of the negotia-
tions mediation was used, either upon direct request of the parties
or in the course of the Commission's investigation. Three-fourths
of the disputes that involved the use of mediation were resolved
without the need for arbitration. 6
There has been widespread compliance with the interest arbi-
tration statute by both management and unions. Many municipal
employers have been opposed to the statute but there appear to be
no instances of management's refusal to carry out arbitrators'
awards.
However, a practical problem has arisen under the law. The
statute provides that either the municipal employer or the union
66.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF POLICEMEN, FIREFIGHTERS,
AND COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN WISCONSIN, BY
METHOD OF SETTLEMENT, 1968 - FIRST QUARTER 1974
1972 a 1973 1974 b
Method of Settlement Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
All settlements 143 100 173 100 147 100
Direct negotiations 103 72 117 68 98 67
Third party assistance 40 28 56 32 4 9 b 33
Mediation 29 20 40 23 25 (2)
Fact-finding 4 3
Arbitration 7 5 16 9 1b (2)(a) The arbitration statute became effective Apr. 20, 1972. Therefore, the disputes over
contracts for calendar year 1972 which had not been resolved by direct negotiations or by
mediation or fact-finding awards prior to that date were resolved by arbitration awards
under the newly enacted law.
(b) It is estimated that most contracts for 1974 had been negotiated by Apr. 1. 1974, or
had been referred to the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission for third-party
assistance of one form or another, although a few unsettled disputes over new contracts may
have been included in the category of direct settlements which, subsequent to that date, were
referred to the Commission for assistance. Of the forty-nine negotiations referred to the
Commission for third-party assistance by Apr. 1, 1974, twenty-five had been settled by
mediation and one by arbitration, and twenty-three were still pending at some step of the
procedure.
NOTE: The number of settlements was calculated from the questionnaires and adjusted to
reflect the response rate of seventy-one percent and the number of two-year agreements.
The number of mediations and of fact-finding and arbitration awards was derived from
State records. State figures were adjusted to cover calendar rather than fiscal years, as
municipal agreements are negotiated on calendar-year basis.




may amend their final offer within five days of the hearing. This
language has proven to be ambiguous and has created problems for
both parties. In allowing either party to manipulate the process of
revising their final offer, the chance that the parties would be able
to settle without arbitration has been diminished. A provision re-
quiring that the final offers be mutually exchanged through the
arbitrator, not less than five days before the hearing, would pro-
mote orderly progress prior to the arbitration hearing and possibly
increase the number of pre-hearing settlements.
Despite occasional difficulties experienced with the law, final
offer arbitration appears to have functioned satisfactorily during
its initial years. Neither unions nor municipal employers have been
clamoring for repeal of the statute. Such acceptance of the present
legislation reflects a policy judgment that the public's right to
continued protective services outweighs the union's right to strike
and the municipal employer's right to bargain every term of the
contract. The success of final offer arbitration in the protective
services does not automatically recommend such a procedure for
all municipal employee impasse situations. The municipal em-
ployer may be willing to trade some of its bargaining power for
an assurance of uninterrupted protective services. However, the
municipal employer may decide that statutory protection of serv-
ices other than law enforcement and fire via compulsory interest
arbitration is not worth the required price in terms of a loss of its
power to "carve out" the final terms of its collective bargaining
agreement with the union.
B. Evaluation of Right-to-Strike Legislation
Right-to-strike legislation has produced varied results. Most of
the states passing such laws have had little or no strike activity
before or after the adoption of right-to-strike legislation. Montana
passed a right-to-strike law for nurses in 1970 but has had no
strikes since passage of the law. Prior to the law there had been
only one public employee strike in that state, a 1969 nurses' strike
at a state hospital.67 In Alaska there have been several work slow-
downs but only one strike since 1973. Prior to 1972 there is no
record of any public employee strikes.18 In Vermont there has been
no strike activity before or after the passage of its right-to-strike
legislation in 1967. Minnesota has had two strikes under its right-
67. Letter from Montana State Board of Health, July 29, 1974.
68. Letter from James A. Witt, Deputy Commissioner of the Alaska Department of
Labor, July 16, 1974.
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to-strike legislation, one in 1973 and one in 1974, with no indica-
tion of strike activity prior to 1971.69 As of August 1, 1973, Hawaii
has had only two strikes by public employees since the law became
effective in July, 1970.71
Contrariwise, Pennsylvania is unique inasmuch as there had
been a marked intensification of strike activity prior to passage of
the right-to-strike legislation. Several major teachers' strikes in
1967 and 1968 had focused public attention on the growing tension
in municipal employee relations and resulted in the appointment
of a "Governor's Committee to Revise Public Labor Relations
Law." In 1970 the legislature passed the right-to-strike law, relying
on the recommendations of the aforementioned Governor's Com-
mittee that "a limited and carefully defined right-to-strike [would
be] a safety value that would in fact prevent strikes." That expecta-
tion did not materialize. Instead, strikes increased dramatically in
number and duration after the passage of the legislation. 71
The growing labor conflict under the Pennsylvania legislation
is exemplified by the two Philadelphia teachers' strikes during the
1972-73 school year. The first strike took place in September of
1972 and lasted twenty-three days. The teachers returned to work
under their old contract but when the parties failed to reach agree-
69. Letter from Minnesota Public Employment Relations Board, July 12, 1974.
70. ABOUD and ABOUD at 20, note 33, supra.
71.
STRIKES IN PENNSYLVANIA (1966-72)
Type 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
All workers a 4 10 13 38 29 7 1b 6 1b
Teachers c - 7 4 26 11 64 38
(a) Source: U.S. Department of Labor, State Profiles: Current Status of Public Labor
Relations (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1971).
(b) Source: Memo, Pennsylvania Department of Mediation, undated.
(c) Source: Statement, Pennsylvania State Education Association before Pennsylvania
House-Senate Committee on Act 195, May 17, 1973.
AVERAGE DURATION OF PENNSYLVANIA TEACHER STRIKES (1966-73)












ment in January of 1973 the teachers struck again. At this point,
the Philadelphia Board of Education sought a court injunction
against the teachers. The court, finding that the strike "constituted
a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety and
welfare of the public" issued the injunction. The teachers ignored
the injunction and continued their strike until late February, 1973.
The public concern over the wide-spread strike activity caused
the Pennsylvania legislature to re-evaluate the 1970 legislation.
Neither municipal employers nor unions have advocated a return
to a ban on strikes. More attention has been focused on the reasons
why unions, and especially teacher unions, have little fear of using
the strike. Pennsylvania state law, which requires that schools be
open a minimum of one hundred eighty days in order to qualify
for state aid, forces school boards to make up school days lost
through strikes. As a result, teachers are generally assured of re-
ceiving pay for one hundred eighty days of teaching and seldom
run any risk of losing pay by going on strike.
A comparison of right-to-strike legislation reveals that the ef-
fect of such legislation upon the number of strikes is related to the
level of strike activity prior to enactment of the legislation. States
which had little or no municipal employee strikes prior to passage
of right-to-strike legislation did not experience a flurry of strikes
subsequent to the aforementioned legislation but have continued to
have a minimum of such strikes. The situation differs, however, in
Pennsylvania which had been experiencing an already high number
of strikes prior to enactment of its right-to-strike legislation. Pas-
sage of right-to-strike legislation did not reduce the number of
strikes. Instead, strike activity increased sharply after the right to
strike was legalized.
The Pennsylvania experience demonstrates that right-to-strike
legislation does not necessarily reduce the number of strikes in a
situation where there is already a high level of strike activity. Any
state which is experiencing a growing number of municipal em-
ployee strikes and is considering enacting right-to-strike legislation
in the hope of reducing such strikes should seriously consider the
experience of Pennsylvania under their law. It might be of great
value for a state such as Wisconsin, where there are a growing
number of municipal employee strikes and where right-to-strike
legislation is currently under consideration, to intensively study the
Source: Statement, Pennsylvania State Education Association before Pennsylvania House-




experience of Pennsylvania prior to any enactment of right-to-
strike legislation.
C. Right to Strike and Compulsory Binding Interest Arbitration
Combination
Legislation incorporating both the right to strike and com-
pulsory arbitration has taken several diverse forms. The right to
choose between strike or compulsory binding interest arbitration
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The restrictions upon the
right to strike and arbitration differ under each legal framework.
1. Canadian Public Service Staff Relations Act
Neither the right to strike nor the arbitration alternatives ap-
pear to have had a harmful effect on the bargaining process in
Canada. As of March 31, 1970, 114 units had the opportunity to
choose between arbitration and conciliation coupled with the right
to strike. The majority of the units reached agreement without the
aid of a conciliator. Fourteen units chose conciliation and the
right-to-strike route but only one unit actually went on strike. The
other 13 reached agreement through direct negotiations or by assis-
tance from a conciliation board. Only four of the 100 units that
initially chose the arbitration route eventually utilized the proce-
dures.12 If success of a system is to be judged by its ability to
encourage negotiated settlements, it appears that both alternatives
under the "Canadian Plan" should be rated favorably.
However, a significant part of this success under the "Canadian
Plan" must be attributed to the built-in limitations on the right to
strike and arbitration. The union's power to exert crippling pres-
sure on the employer is severely restricted by the power of the
Public Service Staff Relations Board to designate certain employ-
ees who shall be prohibited from striking. The Board will deny the
right to strike to any employee whose services are necessary to
public health and security. This restriction on the right to strike
significantly limits the strike option and promotes collective bar-
gaining.
Another limitation found in the "Canadian Plan" is the exclu-
sion of several issues from arbitration thereby making the union's
arbitration option less cosmic. Matters relating to employee ap-
72. See H. W. ARTHURS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN CANADA:
FIVE MODELS at 39, note 49 supra. The authors recognize that the statistics available under
the Canadian Plan are over four years old, but more recent figures were not available.
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pointment, transfer, promotion, demotion, lay-off, discharge, dis-
cipline and classification are not arbitrable and eliminate the use
of arbitration as an impasse procedure on those items. This system
results in allowing the employer to keep control over many of his
management decisions unless the union is willing to strike over
non-arbitrable items.
Even though the union has the right to choose the impasse
procedure, the aforesaid limitations on both the strike and arbitra-
tion option work to offset this advantage. Consequently, it appears
that the "Canadian Plan" does not give any one party an undue
power position in the negotiating relationship.
2. The Oregon Statute
The Oregon law combines the right to strike with compulsory
arbitration in a manner quite dissimilar to the Canadian law.
Under the Oregon legislation, the court makes the choice whether
the union may strike or go to compulsory and binding interest
arbitration. The court becomes the sole arbiter of the danger or
threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public and can enjoin
a strike if such danger or threat exists. Upon enjoining a strike,
the court can order the parties to compulsory interest arbitration.
Arbitration quite clearly becomes the substitute for the strike
under this law.
Theoretically, the parties' uncertainty as to whether they will
be faced with compulsory arbitration or a strike should encourage
them to settle their contract dispute through collective bargaining.
A weak union would be wise to strive for a negotiated settlement
lest it be faced with a strike it could not mobilize. Likewise, a
strong union would be motivated to negotiate the terms of a settle-
ment in the hope it could achieve a result superior to the one
imposed by an arbitrator. Conversely, a weak employer would
prefer a negotiated settlement to a strike it could not handle and
strong management would attempt to negotiate a better settlement
than it would probably receive from an arbitrator. The uncertainty
of the procedures and the courts' total discretion over the matter
would appear to encourage both parties to be equally zealous to
negotiate a settlement rather than be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court and possibly an arbitrator.
Though the court makes the determination of the danger or
threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public, the employer
has some flexibility in the use of the procedures. Practically speak-
ing, if the employer prefers and is willing to undergo a strike rather
1975]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
than submit to final and binding arbitration, he would not initiate
an injunction petition. The employer's decision to petition for an
injunction must be carefully weighed. The price of having the strike
enjoined is the surrender of the power over the final determination
of the contract terms. The value of having continuous municipal
service must be balanced with the cost an arbitration award will
impose upon the municipality.
There had been one public employee strike in 1968 and five in
1973 before the new law became effective on October 5, 1973.
There have been no strikes since passage of the legislation but it is
uncertain whether this reduction in strike activity has been affected
by the legislation.7 3
This legislation does alter the bargaining process to the extent
that the courts have the decision-making power over the form of
impasse procedure to be utilized. The courts insulate the employer
and the public from strikes endangering the public health and
safety but give the union the assurance of an arbitrated contract.
As a result, the decision-making center under this legislation shifts
from the public form of the municipal government process to the
courts and the arbitrator.
3. Clay-Perkins Bill
This bill gives the union the choice of striking or forcing the
employer to accept final and binding fact-finding, said fact-finding
being a euphemism for compulsory interest arbitration. Placing in
the hands of the union the unlimited power to choose the impasse
procedures is to grant those unions power they do not presently
have in the municipal or private sectors. The only limitation upon
the union's right to strike is the possibility that the strike may be
enjoined if there is a clear and present danger to the public health
and safety. The union has the exclusive right to choose between the
strike or binding fact-finding. Either of the above alternatives con-
tains a certain element of risk. If the union strikes, said strike
might be enjoined by the court. If the union chooses to proceed to
final and binding fact-finding, the fact finder may not grant them
as much as they could have secured through collective bargaining.
When analyzed in terms of the municipal bargaining concepts
discussed in the previous section of this article, this bill clearly
gives the union the decision-making power. The right to strike
73. Letter from Melvin H. Cleveland, Executive Secretary of the Oregon Public Em-
ployee Relations Board, August 9, 1974.
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gives the union, as one interest group among many in the local
government bargaining process, a tool other groups do not have;
the right to pressure the employer by withholding services thereby
removing collective bargaining decisions from the normal govern-
mental decision-making context. This power of the union to "force
the employer" to capitulate via the strike is tempered only by the
interjection of a third party (the courts) into the municipal bargain-
ing process. A strike could be enjoined by court action only if it
were determined that the strike would harm the public health and
welfare. Whether the courts, acting as a proxy for the public, can
always determine when the public interest is being threatened is not
easily answered. The wide variance of court decisions in strike
situations demonstrates that there is no predictable norm which
courts follow. The elected officials, as representatives of the public,
are deprived of any choice over the impasse procedures to be uti-
lized in the dispute. The court's ability to enjoin the strike merely
spares the public from the total disaster of a crippling strike which
would clearly harm the public health and safety.
The fact-finding provision allowing the fact finder to make
final and binding recommendations on all of the issues poses a
greater threat to collective bargaining than final offer type of arbi-
tration. All the fears about compulsory interest arbitration could
be realized under this kind of provision which is disguised as fact-
finding. By providing that the fact finder can render a final and
binding decision on each and every issue, vis-a-vis final offer arbi-
tration where the decision maker must choose either the em-
ployer's or the union's offer in toto, the respective parties are less
inclined to seriously bargain prior to the fact-finding hearing in
hopes of benefiting from an anticipated fact finder's compromise
between the parties' extreme positions.
4. Assembly Bill 758
In all right-to-strike states except Montana, municipal em-
ployee strikes are enjoinable by the courts when the public health
and welfare are threatened or endangered. The courts, under most
right-to-strike laws retain the right to intervene in the event of a
strike and, in effect, become the decision making party when the
interests of one group, municipal employees, must be balanced
with the interests of the general public. Under Assembly Bill 758
the courts would have no power to intervene even if the strike were
harming the health and safety of the public. Under the proposed
bill, the union has an unlimited right to strike without regard for
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the health and welfare of the public. It can be seriously questioned
whether the responsibility for the well-being of the community
should be entrusted to a non-elected group with potentially con-
flicting interests.
A comparison of Assembly Bill 758 with the Canadian law
reveals some startling differences between the two. Under the Ca-
nadian law, the public interest is safeguarded by limiting the right
to strike to those employees in a unit who are not essential to the
public health and security. Those employees designated by the
administrative agency as "essential to the public's health and secu-
rity" are never allowed to strike. Under Assembly Bill 758 there
is no provision excepting designated essential employees from
exercising the right to strike. The "Canadian Plan" builds into the
designated employee determination process a guarantee that the
public will not be deprived of essential services. The total absence
of such safeguards under Assembly Bill 758 makes the public vul-
nerable to municipal employee strikes regardless of the effect on
the public's health and safety.
Under the proposed arbitration provisions of Assembly Bill
758, all unresolved issues are arbitrable. This means the union, by
choosing the arbitration option, would be able to remove from the
bargaining process any unresolved issues relating to management
rights or control over the work force. In contrast, the employer's
interests are more effectively protected under the Canadian Plan
which excludes all processes governing appointment, transfer, pro-
motion, demotion, lay-off, discharge, discipline and classification
from arbitration.
The exclusive grant to the municipal union of the option of an
unlimited right to strike or binding interest arbitration can only
work to the public's detriment. Weak unions, with little bargaining
experience or membership interest, would be given a free ride to
the arbitrator's chair. The bargaining strengths attained by long
and arduous union organization and .conscientious membership
involvement would be handed to inexperienced unions by legisla-
tive fiat. On the other hand, the right of the union to strike, without
fear of court injunction, is a powerful tool in the hands of strong
unions. When the union has the power to achieve more by striking
than it could receive from the arbitrator it would obviously take
the strike route. The municipal employer would be handcuffed in
both instances. Weak unions can force arbitration upon strong
employers and strong unions could strike and paralyze a com-
munity.
The power which Assembly Bill 758 would give to municipal
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unions would seriously impair the municipal collective bargaining
process described in a previous section of this article. The munici-
pal union's bargaining power would be enhanced by an unrestricted
right-to-strike thereby allowing it to withhold public services in
hopes of causing that public to put pressure on its elected officials
to cede to its demands. Extending to unions the alternate right to
compulsory arbitration would also alter the political process in
municipal government by allowing the unions to remove the
decision-making power from the normal bargaining context. The
lack of any recognition of employer and public interest under the
proposed legislation would shift the decision-making power from
elected officials to one interest group, namely, the union. Such a
result would be an unfortunate distortion of the normal American
political process in municipal government.
The policy reasons for giving all municipal employees the right
to compulsory and binding interest arbitration are not necessarily
the same as those which support arbitration legislation for law
enforcement and firefighter personnel. The public's need for con-
tinuous and uninterrupted service from its law enforcement and
firefighter personnel may well justify that a bargaining impasse be
resolved at the expense of the employer losing some of its control
over bargaining the final terms of the agreement. This right of the
municipal employer to bargain the terms of the agreement with its
essential employees and their union is traded for the assurance that
impasses will be resolved and essential services continued. The
obvious importance of police and fire protection makes the above
described trade-off a reasonable exchange. Contrariwise, to extend
arbitration rights to all municipal employees would be to make a
policy judgment that prompt and final resolution of all municipal
labor disputes is more important than the municipality's right to
be the architect of the terms of the final contract. In addition, a
municipal employer may be willing to take an illegal strike rather
than allow an arbitrator to decide items affecting the employer's
management rights. Similarly, the employer may value its right to
set fiscal priorities to be more important than suffering the incon-
venience of a work stoppage. The cost to the public of not coming
to agreement in law enforcement and firefighter disputes is greater
than the cost of impasses in other municipal employment disputes.
The price a municipality is willing to pay for its essential services
may be greater than the price it will pay to insure less essential
services. Any legislative granting of compulsory final and binding
interest arbitration to municipal employees reflects a policy deci-
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sion that a municipal employer's prerogative to set its own man-
agement and fiscal priorities are secondary to the employees' pref-
erence for an arbitrator's decision over a bargained agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Wisconsin's existing
Municipal Employment Relations Act is in need of modification,
the previous review of the current or proposed impasse resolution
legislation in Wisconsin and other states generates the following
observations:
First, the legalization of strikes is no panacea which can guar-
antee a reduction in the frequency or duration of strikes. Pennsyl-
vania's experience after enacting a law which provides the right-
to-strike is clearly on point. As noted previously, Pennsylvania's
strike activity which was high prior to the legalization of strikes
increased after their legalization. Likewise, Wisconsin has under-
gone an increase in strike activity. It could well be argued that to
legalize strikes would be to ingest an attractively packaged placebo
with questionable benefits flowing therefrom.
Second, any law legalizing the right to strike should limit by
legislative definition the types of employees who may legally strike.
The aforesaid legislative definition should be built around the con-
cept of allowing the right-to-strike only to non-essential employees
whose withholding of their services does not threaten the public
health, safety or welfare.
Third, strikes would not be legal until the parties had bargained
in good faith to impasse, exhausted all contractual impasse resolu-
tion techniques and submitted their dispute to mediation by a neu-
tral third party.
Fourth, strikes that threaten the community's health, safety
and welfare would be enjoined by the courts and failure by an
employee and/or union to comply with the court's orders would
subject the aforesaid parties to definite and significant monetary
penalties; an employee who would act contrary to the court's in-
junction order would be subject to suspension, demotion or dis-
charge by his or her employer.
Fifth, strikes involving a prohibited practice situation, vis-a-vis
a contract dispute, should be considered illegal and hence enjoina-
ble by the courts; however, prohibited practice situations that are
laden with strike overtones should result in an expedited hearing
and decision making process by the Wisconsin Employment Rela-
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tions Commission to. quickly alleviate the situation. 74
Sixth, employees may strike only when a majority of the strik-
ing unit vote by secret ballot in favor of the strike.
Seventh, it would be a prohibited practice for municipal em-
ployees not on strike to honor picket lines set up by another group
of employees; those employees who would violate this prohibition
would be subject to fines or discharge.
Eighth, if strikes are legalized then state aids to schools should
be prorated so that the municipal school district loses only an
amount of state aid proportionate to days of school not held or
made up.
Ninth, a combination right-to-strike/compulsory arbitration
law should contain the following provisions:
(a) Either the municipal employer or the municipal union has
the right, upon reaching bargaining impasse, to elect to either
strike or lockout if they meet the qualifications set forth in the
above numbered paragraphs or proceed to compulsory binding
interest arbitration. 75
(b) Only monetary items should be subject to arbitration;
pure language and policy issues would not be arbitrable by law.
(c) Final offer compulsory interest arbitration would be uti-
lized unless the parties voluntarily agreed to have the arbitrator
decide on each and every item of dispute.
It should be noted that compulsory interest arbitration legisla-
tion, like the right to strike, has certain potentially negative as-
pects. Specifically, compulsory interest arbitration standing alone
does not insure that a strong, militant union upon receiving an
unfavorable arbitration award would not go out on strike in an
effort to compel the municipal employer to capitulate to its de-
mands. While it is acknowledged that such an action by a union
under the above described circumstances would be paramount to
committing a per se illegal act, the direct prohibition against
strikes in the current Municipal Employment Relations Act has
not prevented certain unions from striking.
In addition, it should be noted that even if under normal cir-
cumstances binding arbitration does prevent strikes, this result is
not without a price. Both the municipal union and the municipal
employer, by being subject to compulsory interest arbitration cede
their traditional collective bargaining right to be the exclusive ar-
74. H. Bellman and H. Graham, A Suggested Remedy for Refusal to Bargain in the
Public Sector: Final Offer Arbitration, 3 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 187 (Spring, 1974).
75. Obviously, paragraph No. 6 would not apply to a lockout by an employer.
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chitects of their collective bargaining agreement to a third party
outside their bargaining relationship. Whether the municipal un-
ions perceive that the ceding of this exclusive right to a third party
is worth it in terms of potentially being able to secure rights and
benefits beyond those which they could derive from bargaining is
a question which they must answer. Likewise, the municipal em-
ployer must decide whether it too desires to cede final decision
making power to a third party arbitrator in exchange for the likeli-
hood that compulsory interest arbitration reduces the probability
of strikes thereby diminishing the potential disruption of com-
munity services.
